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Moffat: The Indispensable Role of Independent Ethical Judgement

THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT

ETHICAL JUDGMENT
ROBERT C.

L.

MOFFAT*

The purpose of this brief comment is to focus attention on the necessary
role of ethical discourse in discussions such as the present one, for a number
of important ethical issues are raised by the papers of the panel. Some of
these issues, indeed, were discussed by the panel, although they may bear
further examination. However, consideration of ethical issues, consciously
or otherwise, would not seem to require justification in discussing a topic
such as The New Biology and the Law. Consideration of what a man or a
society ought to do must surely be inescapable.
As the papers of the panel illustrate, scientists, medical practitioners,
and lawyers all make ethical assumptions. Because they do, it is easy for such
professional persons and for their listeners (or readers) to be lulled into the
belief that the ethical assumptions advanced sub rosa are acceptable and
adequate. It is all the more easy when, as in the present case, no participant
in the exchange is trained as an ethicist.1 In such cases especially, it becomes
vital to recognize that each profession has certain institutionalized values.2
These "professionalized" values are the values by which members of a profession judge the competence and status of a fellow professional.3 They
represent the best interests - as the profession sees them - both of society
and the profession. Jerome Skolnick, for example, has shown how highly
police value the ability to solve crimes while they consider adherence to due
process requirements of very secondary importance. 4 And because these
professionalized values are relatively invulnerable to pressure from outside the
institution, it is almost impossible to effectuate societal control of such
institutions. 5 A man associates most closely with his professional colleagues
and consequently places great value upon their estimation of him. Moreover, the judgment of his fellows usually has profound impact on the success

(or failure) 6 of his career. Hence, professionals are governed most strongly
by the internal values of their own professions. To point out this fact is no
criticism of a profession. It does, however, raise in a very serious way the
question of the right of a profession to make judgments for society based on
professionalized values. South African heart transplant pioneer Christiaan
*BA. 1958; MA., LL.B. 1962, Southern Methodist University; LL.M. 1966, University
of Sydney; Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. A person whose professional training is in the study of ethics. Such individuals are
found primarily in departments of philosophy and religion and colleges of divinity.
2. See generally PROFESSIONALIZATION (H. Vollmer & D. Mills eds. 1966).
3.

See, e.g., J. CARUiN, LAwyERs' ETHIcs (1966); M. JANOWnEz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER

(1960).
4. J. SKmONicK, JusTIcE WrrHouT TRIuL (1966).
5. Id. at 230-45.
6. Professional disciplinary procedures are normally controlled exclusively by the
leadership of the profession concerned.
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Barnard, for example, is reported to have claimed with regard to transplant
ethics that "only doctors have the experience to make such decisions." 7 The
present point argues to the contrary. Impartial judgment of the social interest
demands full and free discussion including the participation of individuals
who make ethical issues their primary concern. Sir Edward Coke long ago
held that one cannot be judge in his own cause; s advocating independent
judgment on ethical issues is surely requiring nothing more.
An example of the need for independent ethical judgment is provided
by the growing medical emphasis upon research and experimentation that has
produced tragedies such as those mentioned by Professor Plant. The reader
may properly be shocked by the "physician" who, for experimental purposes,
injected live cancer cells into patients not suffering from cancer. Moreover,
the aged patients were not told that cancer cells were being injected into
them so there was an absence of informed consent. Most astounding, however,
must be the lack of awareness of even professional ethical issues demonstrated
by the fact that the experimenter felt no difficulty about considering himself
in a "doctor-patient" relationship with his victims. This incident demonstrates
clearly why the medical "good" of experimentation may not necessarily be
equated with social good and why independent ethical judgment is required. 9
Nonetheless, medicine has moved increasingly toward a scientific outlook of
experimentation and added the new industry of research ° to its traditional
concern with care for the sick. Ironically, just when scientific developments
have begun to make the cure of patients possible, medicine seems to be in
the process of discarding its traditional values.
This rise of scientific experimentation as a professional medical value"
also raises more fundamental ethical questions. For experimentation on
humans seems to imply a mechanistic approach that views a person as a mere
object, a "thing" to be manipulated. A contrasting approach, generally
characteristic of ethical theories, might be labeled "humanistic"' 12 because

7. 93 SCIENcE NEws, Mar. 23, 1968, at 282. Other leading medical practitioners, however, do not agree. See Note, Law and Life: Organ Transplants, 20 S.C.L. REv. 765, 779-80
(1968).
8. Ironically, the case concerned a physician who attempted to oppose the professional
medical association. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. l18a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610).
9. One professor of moral philosophy has taken the position that good medicine never
regards the patient as an object of experimentation; a responsible attitude converts good
medicine into good morality. Wassmer, Between Life and Death: Ethical and Moral Issues
Involved in Recent Medical Advances, 13 VILL. L. REV. 759 (1968).
10. See John Fletcher, Human Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation, 32
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 620 (1967).
11. This scientific trend is illustrated by Archambault, Investigational Drugs and the
Law, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 487 (1967); Freed, Legal Aspects of Computer Use in Medicine,
32 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 674 (1967) (computers used in diagnosis, treatment, and patient simulation); Ruebhausen, Experiments with Human Subjects, 39 OKLA. B. ASS'N J.
699 (1968).
12. The usage is not technical and is meant to include both individualist and collectivist approaches to the extent they are not mechanistic or manipulative. Examples of
this unstructured use are varied. E.g., P. BERGER, INVITATION To SocIoLoGY: A HUMANISTIC
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an individual would be considered a person, a subject rather than an object.
This contrast has been expressed, for example, by Martin Buber as the choice
between an "I-it" relationship and an "I-thou" relationship. 3 The experimenter who injected the cancer cells was in an "I-it" relation with his victim.
A humanistic ethical perspective calls for an "I-thou" relationship between
doctor and patient. What this means is not that some special kind of communication would be required to exist but simply that the physician have
due regard for his patient as a person (which requires some communication).
The physician has traditionally expressed this idea in the form of the Hip4
pocratic oath.'
It would certainly be presumptuous to suggest that a shift in ethical
perspectives would provide a panacea for ethical problems. Nonetheless, a
humanistic perspective may provide guidance at a fundamental level. For
example, it is clear that the experimenter in the guise of treating physician
is not treating his patient either medically or with any regard for the patient's
humanity. The answer provided by a humanistic perspective may not be
popular with the experimenter, but the guideline is provided nonetheless.
Another example may be the current cause cdlbre: When is a person dead?' s
a question most often discussed in terms that really seem to mean: When
should the heart-lung machine be turned off?16 Minds uncluttered by the
desire for a potential donor's heart or other organs or by a desire to establish
a new record for keeping a patient alive should see the question in terms of
treatment that is primarily in the best interests of the patient and his family,
and secondarily in the interests of legitimate research. 7 Though such a guideline is far from absolute, it does indicate that a patient should not ordinarily

PERsPEr~vE (1963); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Education, 1 CONN. L. REV.
201 (1968).
13. M. BuBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN (R.G. Smith transl. 1947); M. BuBER, I AND
THOU (R. Smith transl. 1937).
14. Wassmer, supra note 9, contends that good medicine always regards the patient
as a person. A medical professor has expressed similar normative optimism: "Over the
years, morality and ethics have been safeguarded because his effort is structured on a disciplined dedication to the cause of humanity." Likoff, A Perspective for Considering the
Moral, Legal, and Ethical Problems Arising from Advances in Medical Science, 13 VML..
L. REv. 736, 738 (1968; See Elkinton, The Dying Patient, the Doctor and the Law, 13 Viri..
L. REv. 740 (1968). Dubos in his paper for the present panel, however, expresses misgivings
about the Hippocratic oath.
15. See Anderson, Who Will Decide Who Is To Live?, TnE Nuw REPUBLiC, April 19,
1969, at 9. See generally Jos. FLrcHm, MoAILREsPONsIaITY 141-60 (1967) (ethical aspects).
16. A distinction should be made between defining the point at which death has
occurred, which is a matter of medical judgment, and the method of determining if a
patient has reached that point, which is based on ethical and moral principles. Wasmuth,
The Concept of Death, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 32, 44-46 (1969). For a comparative discussion
of the legal and medical aspects of death, see Comment, Liability and the Heart Transplant,
6 HOUSTON L. REv. 85, 86-100 (1968).
17. In one recent case, a boy who had been buried alive was supported by machines
although his brain was dead. Doctors ignored the parents' desire to turn off the machines.
The expenses to the family were $200 per day. Note, supra note 7, at 773. See also How,
Religion, Medicine and Law, 3 CAN. B.J. 365, 421 (1960).
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be kept artificially "alive" when hope is gone for restoration to self-supporting
"life.""' Any final test must be stated not in mechanistic terms but in terms
of the human interests -both individual and social.
There is constant danger in all professions of the development of a
mechanistic outlook simply because of the emotional pressures involved in
any sympathetic consideration of often overwhelming human problems. 19
Undoubtedly, this is an important reason why the term "professional" has
the connotation of detached, aloof, impersonal. The practice of law is
certainly as beset by these problems as other professions. The sacrifice of the
individual client's interests in package settlement practices both civil and
criminal is an example. Failure to counsel clients on how to avoid high-fee
situations has caused recent public outcry. 20 The lawyer too must be at least as
susceptible as other professionals to the danger of permitting ego or financial
gratification to interfere with efficient representation of the client.21 The
lawyer, moreover, is subject to the further dangers that only some persons
may be able to afford his fees; consequently genuine and worthy human
interests may be left unrepresented. And this predicament is multiplied when
he is retained to represent forces that seek to suppress such unrepresented
interests. The areas of consumer protection and resource pollution are only
two of many examples that could be offered. 2 In both cases individual
business interests are represented while the public interest is often ignored,
thus illustrating the wrong that may be perpetrated by elevating individual
concerns above the social good, for human interests are then sacrificed in the
name of serving them. It should be clear that neither individual interests
nor the social good can be given adequate consideration in isolation one
from the other.

18. Adherence to the principle that the physician's duty is to sustain life as long as

possible brings grotesque results. Potter, The Paradoxical Preservation of a Principle, 13
VILL. L. Rlv. 784 (1968). See also Elkinton, supra note 14.
19. This point has been made with regard to the legal system by G. K. Chesterton:
"[T]he horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all judges, magistrates,
barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they are wicked (some of them are good),
not that they are stupid (some of them are quite intelligent); it is simply that they have
gotten used to it. They simply do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the

usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of judgment; they see only
their own workshop." Quoted in Wright, Criminal Correction and the Law, TRIAL, Feb.Mar. 1969, at 27, 46.
20. It has also produced bestsellers condemning the legal profession either implicitly,
N. DAcEY, How To Avoln PROBATE (1965), or explicitly, M. BLOOM, THE TRouasF wrrH
LAwYERS

(1968).

21. The lawyer is concerned with exacting a "professional" fee, Romell, The Reasonable Fee and Professional Discipline, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 94 (1965). But. cf. Korosec,
Legal Ethics and the Poverty Program, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 225 (1966); Note, Legal
Ethics: Standards for Whose Sake?, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 360 (1966).
22. In both instances business interests are able to afford very fine legal counsel in
situations involving an opposing public or general interest usually unrepresented or underrepresented. The lawyer may prefer to take refuge behind the theory that social good
will follow material productivity. See Dall, Law and Resources Problems, 53 A.B.A.J. 433

(1967).
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Sometimes, however, consideration of the social good is used to justify
the exclusion of individual interests altogether. This argument seems to be
made most frequently in scientific contexts and inevitably accompanies a
mechanistic approach. Examples are provided in the papers of both Professor
Dubos and Provost Martin. The latter, while recognizing the existence of
important ethical issues such as social control, does not conceal the assumption
that man is only an object in his optimistic discussion of the possibilities of
operant conditioning and ethology. Similarly, Professor Dubos speaks extensively of a variety of kinds of conditioning in a context that makes clear the
deterministic assumptions involved. What may not be so immediately dear
to the reader is that both men are espousing theory built upon the philosophic
basis of behaviorism. To realize this fact is important, however, because
behavioristic assumptions regarding the nature of man, not only indicate the
significance of the arguments made by Dubos and Martin, but illuminate the
consequences of accepting the mechanistic assumptions offered. For behaviorism not only assumes the invalidity of but explicitly rejects traditional human
concepts such as freedom, responsibility, and purpose. 23 The classic example
of the theory at work is probably provided by the father of the philosophy,
B. F. Skinner, who in one experiment conditioned a pigeon to play ping pong.
The irreverent thought that may occur to one who considers this instance
might be that while Skinner was saying to himself, "Look how I've made this
stupid bird bat the ball with his beak by giving him food," the pigeon may
have been saying to himself, "Look how I've conditioned this guy to give me
food by batting that silly ball around." Nonetheless, if one seriously rejects
freedom, responsibility, purpose, and reason, upon what basis may one decide
which of the participants in the experiment is doing the conditioning and
2
which is being conditioned? 1
The present point is not, however, to offer a refutation of the behavioristic
view of the nature of man. Contrary viewpoints may in fact be found in such
diverse sources as Sartre's existentialism, 25 Piaget's theoretical psychology, 26
2
and Lon Fuller's theory of natural lawY.
The present point, rather, is to
clarify the ethical aspects of such behaviorist assumptions and to emphasize
the ethical consequences of accepting them. For behaviorism, after all,
embodies the mechanistic view of man par excellence not only by denying
his existence as a person but by denying even the significance of the faculty
man has traditionally called his reason. In this way, ethical issues become
irrelevant since the possibility of making judgment in any real sense other
23.

B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HuMAN BEAVIOR (1953).
24. It is important to note that conditioning, as with other manipulation, need not

always be anti-humanistic. As Roger Shinn notes: "Such manipulation can serve freedom.
But there come points when to regard ourselves, our neighbors, and our progeny as objects
to be manipulated for their own good is to destroy humanity by turning persons into
things." Shinn, Christian Ethical Methodology and Questions Relating to Genetics, Jan.
15, 1969, at 8 (unpublished paper read to the American Society of Christian Ethics,

Washington, D. C.).
25. J. P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (H. Barnes transl. 1953).
26. J. PlACEr, THE MoRAn JUDGMENT Or THE CHILD (M. Gabain transl. 1965).
27. E.g., Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1508 n.2 (1955).
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than self-deception is denied. Moreover, even if judgment were possible, it
would be nothing more than a futile pastime, since events are really inevitable
anyway. For inevitability and necessariness are surely implied in a rejection
of human freedom. Furthermore, if man's freedom is really illusory, then
discussion of what he ought to do is not only pointless but rather silly.
In this light the contrast between mechanistic and humanistic ethics
could be restated as a contrast between ethics and no ethics. However, to
put the issue in that form would obscure the fact that denying the possibility
of "doing ethics" is a kind of ethical position. Moreover, there is a danger
of being lured by its implicit sense of inevitability into a failure to recognize
the existence of alternatives - precisely because the philosophy denies that
there are any alternatives! And the tendencies toward these inevitabilist
views must be recognized to be widespread and far from confined to Nazi
Germany or Stalinist Russia.2 8 For this reason it is easy to find distinguished
scholars in a variety of fields warning against the danger of notions of
inevitability. Karl Popper, 29 C. West Churchman, 30 Julius Stone,'3 1 and Roger

Shinn 32 may be cited as examples. And the importance of the warning is that
if it is not heeded, the opportunity for decision is abdicated. Even if one were
afraid that the course of events is inevitable, it would still be necessary to act
as if it were not in order to salvage any possible opportunity to decide. The
mechanistic outlook must not be permitted to win the debate by default.
Science now promises us that in the near future man will alter his genes
to produce supermen, and by a variety of means will control behavior,
personality, and intelligence. 33 Within a very short space of time it will be
not only practicable but easy for parents to determine the sex of their offspring. Such developments underscore the need for social control of implementation of scientific possibilities. 3 4 The social consequences of even such
a relatively minor interference with natural processes as sex determination
may be quite extensive. And society must not abdicate its responsibility to
exercise control over such intervention even if the intervention is ultimately
permitted on the grounds that individual decisions in that area do not
threaten the social ecology. For social control is a direct implication of
humanistic ethics; the possibility of ethics is based on the possibility of
decision both individual and group. Social control can exist only if the
social group has the ability to decide; the notion of exercising control is
inconsistent with the notion of inevitability. 35 Talk of "social control' by

28. This point is deftly but emphatically made by Lamborn, Social Control Through
the Reconstitution of Man, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 452 (1969).
29. K. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (2d ed. corrected 1961).
30. Churchman, On Exponential Change, CENTER DIARY: 18, May-June 1967, at 52; cf.
C. CHURCHMAN,

CHALLENGE TO REASON

J. STONE,

46, 64-65

(1968).

3-5 (1964).
32. R. Shinn, supra note 24.
33. The wave of the future has even reached ESQUIRE, April 1969, at 108-15.
34. R. Shinn, supra note 24.
35. Id. at 7: "The premise of ethical thinking is that we need not do everything we
have the power to do."
31.

E.g.,

LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' RA.SONINGS
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those who believe in inevitability must be understood as meaning nothing
more than social implementation of scientific achievements, since the idea
of control in such a view would be meaningless. For social control is an
outgrowth of human freedom.
The present concern to point out the dangers of mechanistic ethics may
have the effect of portraying science as the enemy of human freedom. Nothing
could be further from the truth; it is in reality the misuse of scientific
capabilities against which these warnings are directed. These capabilities are
tools -to be used by man, tools that challenge him to enhance his freedom
rather than to destroy it. Consequently, man must maintain constant vigilance
that these capabilities do not make him their tool. He must refuse to permit
scientific method to replace ethics, and in the face of all claims of inevitability,
he must insist upon his freedom to exercise true social control. He must use
science to become more human.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

7

